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Refuting
"Relationship-Defined Obligations Means
Caring Only for One's Circle"


By Feng Xin-ming, 2010

(Contents Mostly Excerpted From: “The Traditional Chinese Supremacy of Relationship-Defined Obligations vs. The West's Supremacy of Love”)

反驳
“人倫至上時人們只顧圈子”


馮欣明著,2010年

(內容主要節錄自:
《中華傳統的人倫至上對西方的愛至上》)

"When relationship-defined obligations are supreme," some critics of the traditional Chinese supremacy of relationship-obligations say, "people will care only about relationships and not about right and wrong, justice, the law, or the public interest; people will care only about the rules and interests of their family, clan and narrow circles. That's why in Mainland China people often have no trustworthiness, honesty or integrity; they enrich themselves by taking public property; they practice corruption and fraud, disregard the law, and care only about guanxi (relationships, often unprincipled). It's all thanks to Confucianism's supremacy of relationship-defined obligations and supremacy of guanxi relationships."

This criticism is a distortion of the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations, and a very serious distortion. What is sad is that, both inside and outside China, this distortion is very widespread, the theory is very popular and many people accept it as fact.

No, the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations should definitely not be misunderstood as putting family, clan and circle above right and wrong or above the law, to be rejecting, "for the sake of family, clan and circle", honesty, integrity and trustworthiness, or to be engaging in corruption and fraud.

All traditional Chinese relationship-defined obligations are consistent with justice, morality, and trustworthiness. Obligations contrary to justice, morality and trustworthiness cannot be traditional Chinese relationship-defined obligations. For example, a relationship-defined obligation is that offspring must be xiao or good to parents, and the first tenet in xiao is to uphold the good name of one's parents and ancestors. If to be xiao or good to parents involves going against justice, morality, or trustworthiness, then won't that besmirch the good name of one's parents and ancestors? Can that then still be called xiao or being good to parents? No, of course not. Also, human relationships don't involve only family, clan and "circle", there is at least also that first of the "Five Cardinal Relationships": the relationship between "ruler and subject" or between government and the citizens. The first demand this relationship makes on citizens is that they obey the law, and law is nothing but some rules and regulations set forth by the government based on justice, morality and trustworthiness. Indeed, that relationship-defined obligations are always consistent with justice, morality, and trustworthiness is determined by the very structure of the thought framework of the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations.

In fact, if one's parents ask one to do something that goes against justice, morality and trustworthiness, then one's parents are wrong, and making such an unjust request itself is an act against morality. What are the obligations of the offspring here? Is it to obey the parents' unjust request and act against justice, morality and trustworthiness? No, of course not. And to say yes would be to distort the meaning of relationship-defined obligations. When asked whether to be xiao one needed to always obey one's parents Confucius exclaimed, "What kind of talk is that! What kind of talk is that!" (Chapter 15, "Dissuading and Disputing", Xiao Jing (Classic of Xiao).) Yes, according to relationship-defined obligations, the obligations of the offspring in such a case is to dissuade the parents, and to persist until successful. Otherwise, it's known as "sycophantically obeying and thus entrapping one’s parents in moral unrighteousness". In the Confucian classics this is an extremely serious transgression against xiao. (See Annotation by Zhao Qi of the Han Dynasty on Mencius (Meng Zi), Chapter Li Lou, “The Thirteen Classics Annotated”, published by Zhonghua Shudian, Beijing, 1980, Vol. II, p.2,723.)

Therefore, relationship-defined obligations can only be obligations that are in accord with justice, morality, and trustworthiness. If not, then such "obligations" are not really relationship-defined, but are the result of misunderstandings or distortions of relationship-defined obligations.

As for obeying the law, as pointed out above, the law is merely some rules and regulations set forth by the government based on justice, morality and trustworthiness, and since relationship-defined obligations always require that one adhere to justice, morality and trustworthiness, then relationship-defined obligations must always require that one abide by the law. Persons glorified in Chinese history such as Bao Gong, Hai Rui, haven't they all strictly abided by and enforced law in the face of the powerful? Also, the first of the Five Cardinal Relationships is that between the "rulers", that is, the government, and the "subjects", that is, the citizens, and the first relationship-defined obligation of "subjects" is to obey the law. There should be no conflict between obeying the law and the interests of family, clan and "circle" (friends). If one uses illegal means to obtain some undeserved benefit for family, clan and "circle" (friends), then one is actually harming them by entrapping them in a collaboration with immorality. This entrapment besmirches their and their family's good names, and causes them to be punished by the law when the illegalities come to light.

Here it must be clarified that in the Chinese tradition, when the ruler, government or government leaders carry out wrong policies and enact wrong law, i.e. policies and law opposed to morality and justice, the subjects' duty is to clearly voice their dissent and to try to dissuade the ruler, government or government leaders, but this does not mean it's alright to disobey the law. Throughout Chinese history there have been many subjects who have been lauded as loyal heroes for voicing dissent and trying to dissuade the rulers, but these heroes obey the government and the law even when engaging in dissent and dissuasion, which are conducted through legal channels. Only when the rulers or government and government leaders become immoral and incompetent beyond all hope, when the country is grossly misgoverned and law and order breaks down, only then is the government considered to have "lost the mandate of heaven" and only then does it become the right of the subjects to disobey the law and rise up in revolution to overthrow the government.

At any rate, only by adhering to justice, morality, trustworthiness and law can one be truly good to family, clan and "circle". Again, according to the Confucian tradition such as expressed in the Xiao Jing (Classic of Xiao), to be considered truly xiao, i.e. to be considered truly good to parents, one's conduct at work and in interactions with people outside the family must all be good, because upholding the good name of the parents and ancestors, or even better, bringing glory to the family name, is a most important requirement in being good to parents and ancestors. Therefore, the interests of the family, clan and "circle" can never oppose adherence to law, morality, and trustworthiness. On the contrary, to be truly good to family, clan and "circle", one must adhere to justice, morality, trustworthiness and law.

Furthermore, in the world of relationship-defined obligations, such obligations are not confined to family, clan and "circle", but apply to all human relationships. All human relationships come within the realm of relationship-defined obligations and come with obligations that must be carried out. That means one must take care of all parties that one comes to have relationships with. As long as one come into contact with or have dealings with someone, then relationship-defined obligations govern that contact and those dealings. Between the employer and employee, one neighbor and another, the salesperson and the customer, the policeman and the citizen, etc., even if they aren't relatives, their contact and dealings are still all governed by relationship-defined obligations; they still can not bully, harm, steal from or defraud each other at will. When relationship-defined obligations are supreme, they operate wherever people have contact with other people. Thus the sphere of justice, morality, trustworthiness and obedience to law does not become narrower, but becomes wider. Therefore, that the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations does not lead to caring only for those who are close and disregarding justice, morality, trustworthiness and obedience to law, is determined by the very nature of relationship-defined obligations.

Therefore, the phenomena in Mainland China of corruption, lack of trustworthiness and lack of adherence to the law are a reflection not of the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations, but of exactly the opposite: the abandonment of relationship-defined obligations and the tenets of Confucianism. When relationship-defined obligations are supreme, people will certainly practice strict adherence to justice, morality, trustworthiness and law. Traditionally, haven't Chinese merchants always acted strictly in accordance with trustworthiness, keeping promises, and not cheating even the weak and helpless? The criticism that the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations leads to caring only about family, clan and "circle" is unfounded.

Also, that conclusion is derived from a completely wrong method of deduction. This deduction goes as follows: "The supremacy of relationship-defined obligations is based on relationships among people; therefore it is not based on justice, morality, trustworthiness or obedience to law; therefore it must care only about those in the closest relationships and disregard justice, morality, trustworthiness and law." Isn't this an absurd logic? If applied to the West's supremacy of love, then we would get this conclusion: "The supremacy of love is based on loving other people and therefore is not based on justice, morality, trustworthiness or obedience to law; therefore it must care only about those whom one loves and disregard justice, morality, trustworthiness and law"!

Of course, this distortion of the supremacy of love is also wrong, but is more reasonable than the similar distortion of the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations. That is because all dealings among people involve relationship-defined obligations, and so when relationship-defined obligations are supreme at no time will unjust and immoral behavior be permitted. The number of people one loves, however, is limited and so most dealings among people do not involve love, and so one can imagine that when love is supreme perhaps sometimes unjust and immoral behavior is permitted. Of course, this is fallacy, because the West's framework of the supremacy of love also has a lot of mechanisms to ensure that people don't disregard what is just and moral.

When it comes to Western thought, which is more appropriate for such an attack, no one has raised such a distortion, yet, when it comes to traditional Chinese thought, which is less appropriate for this kind of attack, this distortion has become very popular and has wide currency both inside and outside China. Alas, does this not show that, when it comes to such things, a lot of people nowadays are a bit biased?

Actually, being infected with this kind of incorrect bias is understandable. First, present-day Mainland China is on the whole still relatively poor and backward, and so people look down upon Chinese and the Chinese heritage. Also, the Mainland ideology had once fiercely denounced the "man-eating feudal old society", and to this day opposes "old feudal ways of thinking". Therefore, attacks on Chinese traditional thought are relatively easy to accept and believed. Furthermore, in present-day Mainland China not caring about right and wrong, not being trustworthy, disregard for the law, corruption, embezzlement, and so forth, are indeed relatively common. Although all this is not because of Confucianism but on the contrary, is to a great extent precisely because of the lack of Confucianism, most people nowadays not only don't know the Chinese classics, but also, because of inability to understanding the ancient prose style, aren't even capable of reading them. So they follow what others say and mistake the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations for disregard of justice and morality. In my opinion, however, the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations is such an excellent thought framework that it cannot be suppressed much longer and will soon once again ascend mankind's stage and play a main role.

一些批評中華人倫至上傳統的人說:“當人倫至上時,人們只顧關係,只顧家人、家族和狹窄圈子,以及其中的規矩和利益,不顧正義和公道,不顧法律和公益。所以現在中國大陸人們很多時沒有誠信,假公濟私,貪污欺騙,不守法律,只知道拉關係,都是因為孔教的人倫至上,關係至上。”

這項批評是對人倫至上的曲解,而且是很嚴重的曲解啊!可嘆的是,這曲解在中國和外國都很普遍,說法很吃香,很多人都視之為事實。

不,絕不應該把人倫至上曲解為不顧正義和法律,只顧家人、家族和“圈子”,而為了家人、家族和“圈子”就會拋棄誠信、就會貪污、行騙。

所有人倫定義的義務和責任都是符合正義和誠信的,如果違反正義和誠信的話,就不可能是人倫定義的。例如,人倫規定,子女對父母要孝(對父母和祖先好),而孝的第一條就是要保持父母和祖先的聲譽。如果對父母所謂孝而違反正義和誠信,不就是敗壞了父母和祖先的聲譽嗎?還能是孝(對父母好)嗎?不能的。而且,人倫關係裡不僅有家人、家族、和圈子,另外還有“五倫”中的第一倫,那就是“君臣”,亦即是政府與人民之間的人倫關係。這個人倫關係對人民的第一項要求就是要遵守法律,而法律則不過是政府基於正義和誠信而成立的一些條例和規章而已。所以,人倫定義的義務和責任必然符合正義和誠信,這是人倫至上的思想結構本身所決定的。

如果父母要求子女做違反正義和誠信的事,那麼父母就是錯誤了,作出這種要求本身就是做了違反道義的事情,子女這時的義務和責任是甚麼呢?是聽從父母錯誤的要求,做出違反正義和誠信的事情嗎?不,這樣做就把人倫完全曲解了,被問孝是不是只管服從父母時,孔子就喊叫,“這是甚麼說話啊!這是甚麼說話啊!(是何言與!是何言與!)”(見《孝經》“諫諍章第十五”。)根據人倫的規定,子女這時的義務和責任就是勸諫父母,還要堅持,直到成功為止。不然的話,就是“阿意曲從,陷親不義”了,在孔教經典裡,這是非常的、極大的不孝。(見漢朝趙岐對《孟子:離婁篇》的註疏,“十三經註疏”,中華書店北京1980版,下集第2723頁。)

所以,人倫所要求人們履行的義務和責任,只可能是符合正義和誠信的義務和責任。否則的話,必定不是人倫所真正要求的,而是對人倫所要求誤會或曲解而得出來的。

至於守法,如上文所指出,法律不過是政府基於正義和誠信而成立的一些條例和規章而已,所以既然人倫必會符合正義和誠信,那麼人倫必會規定人們遵守法律。中華歷史上歌頌的包公、海瑞等人,不都是鐵面無私、不懼權貴、嚴守法則的嗎?同時,五倫的第一項人與人關係就是“君臣”,即政府和人民的關係,而人民對政府的第一項義務和責任,就是遵守法律。遵守法律跟履行對家人、家族、和朋友(圈子)的義務和責任是沒有衝突的。反而,如果用犯法的手段來為家人、家族、和朋友謀一些不應該得到的不義之財,便是把他們“陷於不義”。這只能傷害他們而已。陷於不義,便把他們和他們家族的好聲譽垢污,而且不法行為暴露時他們也會被法律懲罰。

這裡要澄清一件事情:中華傳統裡,當“君主”即政府或政府領導人執行錯誤的政策或成立錯誤的法律時,臣民的責任是對君主明確地提出異見,進行勸諫,但這並不是提倡不遵從法律。中國歷史裡有很多被歌頌為忠臣的英雄,都是對“君主”勇敢地提出異見、進行勸諫的,但是,就算是進行勸諫時,他們都遵從政府和法律,勸諫都是通過合法途徑的。中華傳統裡,只有當政府的無道和無能,達到了沒有希望的地步、國家被嚴重地錯誤統治、治安和法紀破壞時,只有這時才可以說政府“失去了天命”,而只有這時人民才有權違反法律,起來進行革命,推翻政府。

總之,只有遵守正義、誠信和法律,才是對家人、家族和“圈子”真正的好。孝就是對父母和祖先好,而根據孔教傳統,好像《孝經》所規定一樣,要在工作崗位上和跟家庭以外人們相處的行為都好,才能算為真正的孝。這是因為保持父母和祖先的聲譽,或甚至更好地,耀揚“家聲”(家族的名聲),是對父母和祖先好的最重要一條。所以,不能把家人、家族和“圈子”跟正義、誠信和法律對立起來。相反,人倫至上思想構架裡,要對家族和“圈子”好,就一定要遵守正義、誠信和法律。

人倫世界裡,人倫關係並不限於家人、家族和“圈子”,而是包括所有人與人關係。所有人與人關係都屬於人倫範圍之內,都具有須要履行的義務和責任,那就是說,都要照顧這些跟自己有關係的各方。 只要跟任何人有接觸,有來往,便有人倫定義的義務和責任來規範。雇主和僱員、鄰居和鄰居、售貨員和顧客、警察和平民等等,雖然不是親人,但他們的接觸來往也仍然有人倫的規範,也不可以進行欺凌、傷害或偷騙。人倫至上時,人倫在所有人與人接觸的範圍裡都運行。這樣,正義、誠信和守法的範圍不是變為更狹窄,而是變為更廣泛了。所以,人倫至上不會只顧親近自己的人而漠視正義、誠信和守法,這是由人倫至上的本質所決定的。

所以,現代中國大陸貪污、不誠信和不守法等現象,並不是因為華人信奉人倫至上,而是完全相反,是因為華人遺棄了人倫至上、忘記了孔教信條。人倫至上的時候,人們必定會嚴格遵守正義、誠信和法律。以前傳統的華人商人不都是誠信至上,一諾千金,童叟無欺的嗎?指責人倫至上令人們只顧親人而不顧正義這個批評,是不能成立的。

而且,把人倫至上說為令人只顧親人而不顧正義,也是用完全錯誤的推理方式得出結論的。這個推理方式就是:“人倫至上是基於人與人的關係的,所以不是基於正義的,所以一定只顧關係親近的人而漠視正義。”這不是荒謬的邏輯嗎?如果用於西方的愛至上思想構架,就得出這個結論了:“西方的愛至上是基於愛的,所以不是基於正義的,所以一定只顧心愛的人而漠視正義”!

當然,這樣曲解愛至上也是錯誤,但總比曲解人倫至上較為有理。這是因為跟任何人接觸都涉及人倫,所以人倫至上不可能有時會容許對某些人進行不正義的行為。但是,一個人所愛的人數量有限,所以跟多數人接觸時就不會涉及愛,因此能夠想像到,愛至上有可能有時會容許對某些人進行不正義的行為。當然,這也是謬論,因為西方的愛至上思想構架裡,也有很多機制,使人們不會漠視正義。

對更為合適這樣攻擊的西方思想,這種曲解就沒有人提出來,反而對比較不那麼合適這樣攻擊的中華傳統思想,這種曲解卻在中國和外國都很吃香,有很大市場。唉,這不是反映了當今很多人們,看待這種事物是抱著一點成見的嗎?

其實,被這種錯誤成見感染,也是能夠理解的。首先,現在中國大陸總的來說,還是比較貧窮落後,人們便看不起華人和華人傳統。加上,大陸的意識形態曾經激烈斥責“吃人的封建舊社會”,現在也仍然反對“封建舊思想”。所以,對中華傳統思想的評擊,中外人們都比較容易接受,信以為真。而且現在中國大陸,不理會正義、不守誠信、不守法、貪污作弊等,也的確比較普遍。雖然這不是因為有了孔教,而相反地在很大程度上是因為沒有了孔教,但是,多數人對中華經典書籍不但根本不認識,而且因為不曉文言文,連看也看不懂,所以很多人便人云亦云,便都把人倫至上曲解為不講正義了。但是,曲解再吃香也畢竟是曲解。依我看來,人倫至上思想構架這麼優秀,是不能再抑制多久的,很快它便會再登上人類舞台,重新擔演主角了。


 
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